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Directing democracy: Competing interests and 
contested terrain in the John Lewis Partnership 
 
Abstract 
The John Lewis Partnership is one of Europe’s largest models of employee ownership and 
has been operating a form of employee involvement and participation (EIP) since its 
formation in 1929. It is frequently held up as a model of best practice (Cathcart, 2013) and 
has been described as a “workers’ paradise” (Stummer and Lacey, 2001). At the beginning of 
2012, the Deputy Prime Minister of the UK unveiled plans to create a “John Lewis 
Economy” (Wintour, 2012). As John Lewis is being positioned at the heart of political and 
media discussions in the UK about alternatives to the corporate capitalist model of enterprise, 
it is vital that more is known about the experience of EIP within the organisation. This paper 
explores the ways in which the practice of EIP has changed in John Lewis as a result of 
competing employee and managerial interests. Its contribution is a contemporary exploration 
of participation in the John Lewis Partnership and an examination of the ways in which 
management and employees contested the meaning and practice of EIP as part of a 
‘democracy project’ which culminated in significant changes and degeneration of the 
democratic structures. 
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Introduction 
The John Lewis Partnership (JLP) has been positioned at the heart of political and media 
discussions in the UK about alternatives to the corporate capitalist model of enterprise. It has 
been described as a “workers’ paradise” (Stummer and Lacey, 2001), a “blue-print of a 
perfect world” (Reid, 1995), and a place where all the employees are “relentlessly 
nice”(Henley, 2010). In the last few years JLP has been cited as the inspiration for proposed 
changes to organisations including a care home, a high school, an NHS Trust and a 
University (Boden et al., 2011; Kingsley, 2012). In 2012, the Deputy Prime Minister of the 
UK unveiled plans to create a “John Lewis Economy” and an end to “crony capitalism” 
(Wintour, 2012). All three of the main UK political parties have expressed an interest in the 
‘John Lewis model’ for reforming the public sector, and the media has reflected this with 
regular articles on employee-ownership in general and the JLP in particular. A common 
theme in the media coverage is that the company is owned by the employees, highly 
successful, shares profits with the staff, and has a democratic structure. It is this last element 
which is explored here. The paper critically examines the changing meanings and practice of 
organisational democracy in the JLP. By focusing on a ‘democracy project’ conducted by the 
organisation between 2004 and 2007 it illustrates the competing interests and contested 
terrain at the very heart of the JLP. In doing so it contributes to the literature on 
organisational democracy and participation by illuminating the structures and methods by 
which democracy can degenerate and its meaning become contested. 
The article begins with a brief discussion of the literature on participation, noting the 
conceptual confusion about the meaning and forms of participation. Drawing on discussions 
of the degeneration thesis the threats to democratic participation are outlined. Next the JLP is 
introduced, followed by a detailed outline of the democracy project initiative. In the empirical 
section of the article the competing understandings of democracy are mapped through 
interviews with management and employees, observations of key democratic forums, and 
analysis of articles and letters published in the in-house magazines. The article concludes 
with a discussion of the broader implications of the research. 
 
Participation and Organisational Democracy 
A review of the literature on Employee Involvement and Participation (EIP) reveals a range 
of descriptions and terms which have been used almost interchangeably by writers (Cooke 
and Kothari, 2001; Cressey et al., 1981; Marchington et al., 1992; Ramsay, 1977a). It is clear 
that there is considerable conceptual confusion in the area and much that has been claimed in 
the names of these concepts remains “elastic” (Wilkinson et al., 2010: 10). Dachler and 
Wilpert’s (1978) typology of social theories underlying participation has been widely cited as 
a framework for representing the values, assumptions and goals of the designers and 
implementers of various participatory schemes (see for example: Barsky, 2008; Cheney, 
1999; Stohl and Cheney, 2001; Warner, 1984). The four social theories are ‘Democratic 
theory’, ‘Socialistic theory’, ‘Human growth and development theory’ and ‘Productivity and 
efficiency orientation’ and cover goals as varied as a revolutionary change in society, through 
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to ensuring the stability of the current economic order (Dachler and Wilpert, 1978: 3,8,9). 
The diversity of social theories underpinning competing conceptions of participation help 
explain why multiple meanings are both important and inevitable. In order to understand the 
model of participation represented by the JLP, it is therefore vital to explore both the 
intentions of the founder, and the current goals of the management and workers. 
Employee Involvement and Participation (EIP) can be seen as a range of practices, starting 
with information-giving and culminating with worker control. This “escalator of 
participation” (Marchington et al., 1992: 7) has been widely cited (see for example Cox et al., 
2009; Dundon et al., 2004) and focuses on the degree of participation as measured by the 
extent to which employees are able to influence decisions in the organisation. Establishing 
the degree, along with consideration of the form, range and level are all part of the growing 
recognition that precision is needed in examining and testing claims (Wilkinson et al., 2010: 
10). As will be seen in the next section, the JLP has well established, wide-ranging, deeply 
embedded participatory structures at all levels of the organisation. Despite this, it will be 
argued that the degree of control employees exercise over decision-making (Bernstein, 1976) 
has declined as a direct result of recent changes in the organisation. 
Organisational democracy has been selected as the key conceptual framework because that is 
the term used by the founder of the JLP, John Spedan Lewis  when he set out his vision of a 
co-owned business based on the principle of sharing knowledge, gain and power (John Lewis 
Partnership, 1953: 5). Despite major changes to the organisation over its 80 year history, its 
current Constitution still claims that democratic principles are at the heart of its power-
sharing model (John Lewis Partnership, 2012: 9). Organisational democracy (the pinnacle of 
the escalator of participation) is based on the principle of the democratic right of workers to 
participate in decision making. One of the earliest uses of the term industrial democracy in 
the UK was by the Webbs who outlined the principle that “all men are equal, but also that 
what concerns all should be decided by all”. (Webb and Webb, 1902: 8). This definition 
flowed from the classical Greek concept of democracy, the rule of the citizen body (demos) 
and the right of all citizens (thus excluding women and slaves) to make decisions (Bullock 
and Trombley, 1999: 208). Following others (see for example:Dundon and Wilkinson, 2006: 
383; Turner, 1997: 310), participation will be used here as an all embracing term to indicate a 
broad spectrum of practices and structures. Organisational Democracy will be used as a 
specific form of participation, based on the principle of the democratic right of workers to 
extend a degree of control over decision-making (Cheney, 1995; Dow, 1993: 170). 
 
Organisational democracy under threat 
In reflecting on the meaning of organisational democracy, and the threats to its practice there 
is a danger of assessing the organisation using bureaucratic standards that it does not share 
(Rothschild-Whitt, 1979: 510). Instead, the focus here is on exposing the different value 
framework through which decisions are made. For that reason Weber’s fourth type of social 
action and legitimacy which he described as “value-rational” (1947: 115,126) i.e. a belief in a 
value for its own sake, is pertinent. Satow (1975) extended Weber’s typology and developed 
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the concept of value-rational authority committed to ideological goals, to construct an ideal 
type organisation. The concept of an ideal type organisation based on a value-rational form of 
authority was further developed by Rothchild-Whitt (1979). She outlined the attributes of a 
collectivist-democratic organisation and noted the factors that limited the attainment of the 
ideal including time, homogeneity and environmental constraints. Although there is no 
suggestion here that the JLP comes close to the ideal type collectivist democracy, the crucial 
point is that there is a need to acknowledge the wholly different values that underpin 
alternative forms of organisation and use that knowledge to develop a richer understanding of 
democratic practice. Rather than see democratic processes as only successful if they 
contribute to organisational performance (Kerr, 2004: 81), underlying values are exposed and 
used to develop different measures of success. 
There is a growing literature exploring both the external and internal threats to meaningful 
participation at work including discussions of economic and political societal level forces 
(Ramsay, 1977a; Wilkinson et al., 2010), industrial relations regulations and legal 
frameworks (Johnstone et al., 2004; Teague and Hann, 2010), and the paradox of managers 
defending the managerial prerogative at the same time as pursuing employee involvement 
(Stohl and Cheney, 2001; Upchurch et al., 2006). The degeneration thesis has its origins in 
Marxist and socialist critiques of co-operative organisations and contends that isolated 
organisations are unable to change the wider forces of capitalism, and will eventually need to 
maximise profits in the same way as traditional capitalist enterprises (Cornforth, 1995; 
Hadley and Goldsmith, 1995; Sauser, 2009). Thus, democratic organisations will ultimately 
need to adopt the same structures and priorities as capitalist businesses in order to survive and 
democratic decision-making degenerates into decisions determined by the elite (Ng and Ng, 
2009). A number of criticisms have been levelled at the degeneration thesis, in particular that 
it assumes that organisations are unable to actively pursue strategies which avoid the 
concentration of power. For example, Rothschild-Whitt and Lindenfeld (1982) have argued 
that there are ways of preventing the monopolistic use of expertise, through for example, 
training and job-rotation. Cornforth (1995: 520) has pointed out that the single biggest form 
of defence against degeneration is to be vigilant for its signs, and to regularly review 
performance both as a co-operative and as a business. Similarly, in their study of a 
cooperative in India, Varman and Chakrabarti (2004: 203) noted that democracy was a 
balancing act and required constant vigilance to prevent degeneration. The question of 
degeneration in the JLP is explored later. 
 
The John Lewis Partnership 
The John Lewis Partnership (JLP) comprises 39 Department Stores and 288 Waitrose 
Supermarkets and employs 81,000 permanent staff who are ‘partners’ in the business (John 
Lewis Partnership, 2013). It was created in 1929 when John Spedan Lewis (JSL) signed an 
irrevocable settlement in trust which meant that the retail business which his father started in 
1864 would be held in trust for the workers “present and prospective” (Lewis, 1948: 64). The 
Constitution (1928) set out a vision of a co-owned business based on the principle of sharing 
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knowledge, gain and power. JSL this as an experiment in industrial democracy, : “...an 
attempt so to organise and conduct a business that all the advantages whatsoever of owning it 
shall be shared as fairly as possible by all who are working in it.” (Lewis, 1948: v). A 
detailed description of the JLP’s structures and processes are beyond the scope of this paper 
and have been done elsewhere (see for example: Cathcart, 2006; Cathcart, 2013; Oakeshott, 
2000), however the three key dimensions of the organisation (power, gain and knowledge) 
are described briefly here. 
The sharing of power is achieved by dividing it between several bodies, the Partnership 
Council, the Board and the Chairman. The Council consists of elected representatives from 
each store and its purpose is to hold management accountable, make key governance 
decisions, elect members to the Board, and if necessary dismiss the Chairman (Lewis, 1954). 
The Board consists of the Chairman, 5 Directors chosen by him and 5 elected by the Council 
and has responsibility for the overall management of the business. The Constitution of the 
Partnership outlines the principles and structures of the JLP and can only be altered with the 
approval of two thirds of the Partnership Council. The Partners’ Counsellor and a team of 
Registrars in each store have responsibility for ensuring that the Constitution is upheld. In 
addition to the Council, each store operates a Branch Forum, where democratically elected 
representatives from each department meet to debate key issues. These are explored more 
fully in the results section. The sharing of gain is achieved in several ways. Firstly, both a 
minimum wage (based on a calculation of living costs) and a maximum wage (originally set 
at 25 times the pay of the lowest paid full-time employee but changed in 2012 to a ratio of 
1:75) were introduced in 1924 (John Lewis Partnership, 2012; Lewis, 1954: 30). Secondly all 
partners receive an annual profit-share, calculated as a percentage of salary, this is known as 
the Partnership Bonus and over the last twenty years has averaged 15 per cent of pay 
(Cathcart, 2013: 6). Knowledge is shared in a number of ways. Firstly, in-house magazines 
(The Gazette and the Chronicle) are distributed to partners on a fortnightly basis. Partners can 
write anonymously to the magazines and their letters and replies (usually by Senior 
Management) must be published. Secondly, detailed business information (sales figures, draft 
policy changes) is shared during weekly communication half-hours on the shop-floor in every 
part of the store, in presentations at Branch Forums, and through the in-house magazines. 
JLP introduced a partner opinion survey in March 2003 (Gazette, 10/04/04), the results 
indicated that there was significant levels of dissatisfaction with pay, administration, staffing 
levels and the democratic bodies (Partner Opinion Survey Results, 2003-2006). When the 
results in 2005 and 2006 confirmed the problem, the Chairman announced the formation of a 
‘democracy project’ to develop a new proposal for more effective democratic arrangements. 
The principles that any proposal had to meet were determined by the Chairman and were 
closely aligned to those laid down by the founder, JSL (Lewis, 1948): 
 A mechanism for Partners to exercise their responsibilities as co-owners 
 The opportunity for partners to express their views to management on how the branch 
is being run 
 The opportunity for Partners to raise their agendas with their managers 
 The facility for partners to sign off/approve key decisions 
7 
 
 The facility to raise issues anonymously 
 A safety valve when things go wrong. 
The subsequent democracy project, led to the trial of a number of models of participation in 
three different stores. It will be demonstrated that the management in the Partnership shaped 
the results of the trial in a way which led to dramatic changes to the meaning of democracy 
and a degeneration of democratic practices. 
 
Methods 
The research took place between 2004 and 2007 in the UK. A case study approach was 
employed because of its ability to establish a “holistic picture of how employee involvement 
operates” (Marchington et al., 1994: 891). Ramsay (1980) has noted that research on 
participation has tended to focus on ‘best practice’ and that little attention has been paid to 
failures. One of the interesting features of this research is that the JLP had identified its 
current approach to participation as problematic; this ’failure’ provided a rationale for 
experimenting with new structures. Access to the organisation was initially obtained through 
contact with a Senior Manager at one of the stores. As the workers in the organisation 
became more accustomed to the researchers presence, and a clearer understanding of the 
structures developed, permission was sought to observe meetings and interview people in 
other stores, and in the London-based head-quarters. The Partnership was very open to the 
research and all requests to interview subjects, attend meetings, or retrieve archival material 
were approved. The main methodological techniques that were used were documentary 
analysis, observation of meetings (n=31) and semi-structured interviews (n=30). The majority 
of the data were collected at one of the stores that had been nominated for the democracy trial 
(Northern Branch) and at Head Office. 
Interviews were conducted with Partners (n=19) and Managers (n=11) who were selected 
through a combination of theoretical, convenience and snowball sampling (Bryman and Bell, 
2003; Glaser and Strauss, 2004; Locke, 2001), they were recorded and transcribed. Meetings 
included small ‘communication half-hours’ which took place before the store opened, 
through to highly formalised Partnership Council meetings, with representatives from every 
single store, and lasting about five hours. During meetings detailed notes were taken, some 
contributions were written down verbatim, and room layout, atmosphere and audience 
reactions were noted. Data were collected from a range of sources and branches in order to 
capture "the multiplicity of voices, opinions and 'realities' of people working in the 
organisation (Mangan, 2009: 102). A process of categorising and theme identification took 
place (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Coding was done using themes based the theoretical 
framework, and data were interpretively analysed (Seale, 2004: 299). Following Butler 
(2009) both a priori and emergent codes were used to examine the data, some pre-determined 
by the conceptual framework and others emerging as analysis took place. 
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Results & Discussion 
This section explores the meaning of democracy in the JLP. It summarises the process and 
outcomes of the democracy project, followed by a discussion of the ways that democracy was 
contested by management and non-management Partners. 
 
The Democracy Project 
A key part of the Democracy Project was a survey designed by the Chief Registrar. Partners 
were asked to respond to questions about the level of involvement that they wanted in their 
Branch. Prior to this each branch had a Branch Council in place, consisting of representatives 
from each department in the store. The Branch Councils met every few months and debated 
and voted on key decisions including trading hours. The Democracy Survey gave Partners a 
list of issues and asked them to select their preferred level of involvement. Results are below. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 & 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The results were interpreted at a meeting of the Divisional Registrar and members of the trial 
Branches. They noted the similarities of the findings from all three stores and a memo from 
the Divisional Registrar to the Chairman following the meeting concluded that there was “a 
high level of disinterest in the whole democratic piece” (2 August 2005). The group agreed to 
build a new model, replacing Branch Councils with Branch Forums and in June 2005 a 
proposal was made to the Partnership Council who agreed to suspend the rules governing 
existing Branch Councils to allow “experiments to proceed” (Gazette, 13/05/06: 9). 
Significantly, the group proposed that: 
“The new body would not have decision-making powers but be critical to providing the 
opportunity to influence thinking and implementation. While this does not match the criteria 
of giving Partners “the facility to sign off/approve key decisions” it is clear both from the 
questionnaire results and input given through Branch focus groups that Partners do not attach 
a premium to decision-making. Instead they are anxious to secure the chance to input at the 
formulation of proposals stage and have a say in the ‘how’ rather than the ‘what’.” 
(Democracy Project Proposal - Memo to Chairman from Divisional Registrar, Proposal for 
trial, 2 August 2005) 
This interpretation by the Divisional Registrar and her steering group was crucial to the 
subsequent experimentation with democratic structures. It represents the survey results as a 
desire for ‘voice’ but not a desire for ‘democracy’. By emphasising the disinterest in 
democracy and blending issues of voting with personally raising questions – the Divisional 
Registrar was able to claim that Partners wished for their decision-making powers to be 
removed. A claim which was rejected by Northern Branch who asked to trial a variation on 
the model and retain the capacity to vote, this was approved by the Partnership Council. In 
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November 2005 the first Branch Forums were held. The in-house magazines published 
regular updates on the democracy project that were positive in tone and emphasised the 
historical significance of the trials and the opportunities to engage in the democratic process. 
In May 2006, the Gazette published an extensive report which quoted the Divisional 
Registrar: 
“It is a much more collaborative way of working that avoids the polarisation of opinion that 
can occur at Branch Councils” (Gazette, 13/05/06: 11). 
Subsequent issues of the Gazette indicated a more critical reaction to the trials, for example 
one disgruntled Partner wrote anonymously to the ‘letters’ page’ complaining about the 
removal of voting rights under the heading “turkeys voting for Christmas” (Gazette, 
16/08/06). In September 2006 a new survey was conducted in the three trial Branches, the 
results indicated support for the new forums with 83% of Partners stating that they would like 
to see the trial made permanent across the Partnership. However, only 49% agreed that the 
Forum was effective at influencing branch decisions (Democracy Survey Results 2006). In 
2007, the Chairman retired and the newly appointed Chairman was asked to comment on the 
democracy project: 
“...the most exciting thing is that it brings the democracy and the business together...it really 
unlocks the competitive advantage that should come from our democratic bodies” (Gazette, 
29/06/07) 
The Council were asked to approve new democratic arrangements for all Branches based on 
the model outlined by the Divisional Registrar. The proposal allowed Branches to choose 
whether to adopt the ‘consultation’ model trialled at Southern and Scottish Branch or the 
“Decision-Making” model trialled at Northern Branch. It clearly emphasised the advantage of 
the former, describing the consultation model as “more honest” and addressing “the belief 
that the bodies hold more power than is actually the case”. The question of decision-making 
rights was summarised: 
“There is a widely held view that senior management have the skill and experience to make 
commercially astute decisions and can be trusted in doing so to consider Partners’ views. On 
the other hand there is a strongly held view that for many Partners, democracy means having 
a vote - and indeed some Partners would favour all Partners being asked to vote on major 
issues.” (Report on the Democracy Project- The John Lewis Proposal 2006) 
The proposal was accepted; 74 Councillors voted in favour, 6 against and one abstained 
(Gazette, 29/6/07: 11). Of the 37 stores in the Partnership, 29 adopted the Consultation Model 
and 8 decided to retain their decision-making powers. 
Directing Democracy 
In terms of the Dachler and Wilpert (1978) framework outlined in section one it is suggested 
that JSL’s conception of industrial democracy would be broadly located within the ‘human 
growth and development’ grouping(Cathcart, 2010: 287). He envisaged Partnership as a way 
in which employers would benefit from a motivated workforce, through productivity gains 
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and enhanced legitimacy (Cloke and Goldsmith, 2002; Mintzberg, 1983). However, he also 
saw worker participation as part of the ongoing humanisation of capitalism (Bernstein, 1976) 
and a way of addressing “inequality in the distribution of power, income, sense of security, 
and other satisfactions of ownership.” (Lewis, 1948: x). In short, the values which 
underpinned the experiment in industrial democracy were quite different to those 
underpinning more traditional organisational forms based on norms of formal rationality. One 
of the key subjects explored in this article is the extent to which the democratic values of the 
founder continue to direct practice in the present day. The current Chairman stated that the 
primary motivation for continuing to pursue democracy in the Partnership was an 
instrumental one, that “engaging employees was great business practice”. He argued that this 
was the reason that JSL had built democratic checks and balances through the Constitution. 
Other managers talked about the opportunity created by the dual role of Partners as both 
shareholders and employees. They saw democracy as a key mechanism for allowing Partners 
to hold management accountable (shareholder role), and engaging Partners to work with 
management in pursuit of the ‘agreed’ vision (employee role). Managers took pains to 
emphasise that what was good for the business was also what was good for the Partners: 
“Their engagement, makes us a better run company, they want to work here, and they have a 
say in how we’re run” (Manager, Branch) 
“We are shareholders...through our democratic bodies we should be pushing managers to 
achieve better results” (Senior Manager, Branch) 
JSL stated that the ultimate purpose of the Partnership was the “happiness of all its members, 
through their worthwhile and satisfying employment in a successful business” (John Lewis 
Partnership, 2000: 7). This ‘happiness’ clause was invoked frequently in discussions and it 
became clear that whereas non-management Partners tended to relate the pursuit of happiness 
to questions of work-life balance or welfare issues; managers focused on the link between 
happiness and business income. For managers, happiness would flow from a profitable 
business: 
“Happiness and profit go hand in hand” (Manager, Branch) 
“Happiness is providing a sustainable business model” (Senior Manager, Head Office) 
The democracy project symbolised a subtle shift in management’s interpretation of the values 
and principles which underpinned the organisation. Whereas the founders’ conception of 
industrial democracy would be broadly located within Dachler and Wilpert’s (1978) ‘human 
growth and development’ grouping, the current managers focus was on ‘productivity and 
efficiency’. For the management, commitment to ideological goals (Satow, 1975) was 
secondary to achieving organisational ones. Refining survey questions was a vital element of 
the management’s desire to shape responses. The original survey asked Partners whether they 
wishes to ‘make decisions’ or ‘give input/influence decisions’. As noted above, the majority 
opted for the ‘influence’ option and this was interpreted as not wanting to be involved in 
decision-making. An alternative reading might have been that Partners wanted to continue to 
operate a form of representative democracy, where they gave input/influenced the decisions 
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of their elected representatives, who then made democratic decisions on their behalf (by 
voting). Instead the result was interpreted as “no appetite for decision-making” and a clear 
preference for voice rather than power. A Senior Manager claimed “the statistical validity 
gave us a mandate” and the results became incontestable data which were used repeatedly by 
the management to close down dissent. Numerous articles submitted by management to the 
in-house magazines repeated the claim that Partners were not interested in decision-making. 
Rather than seeing organisational democracy as the pinnacle of participation, management 
sought to dilute democracy and move down the escalator of participation. 
For many of the non-management Partners, their unhappiness with the existing democratic 
structures stemmed from very different concerns to those of the management. For some, 
democracy meant that they had a voice, that you could “speak up and have your say” and 
“express your opinion”. For others, the democracy was symbolic of the Partnership’s 
difference. They believed that it was their business, that they owned it, and therefore they had 
the right to determine the decisions that were made about it: 
“I know there are links with loyalty and long term employment, but for me, I enjoy working 
here, this is a democracy and we don’t have to slavishly follow profit” (Non-management 
Partner, Branch) 
Almost all the non-management Partners that were interviewed believed that the ability of 
their Branch Councillor or Forum representative to vote was a crucial part of democratic 
engagement. They saw voting as the ultimate expression of democratic practice, and cited 
occasions when in the past voting had been used to overturn management proposal: “There 
have been times when we’ve voted against what they want, and we have got our say, you 
know it does work”. Examples cited included: trading hours, Branch name changes, and shift 
patterns. As the trial progressed the Northern Branch partners became concerned that they 
were the only Branch that had chosen to retain the vote and expressed bewilderment at the 
‘decision’ taken by other Branches to consult but not vote: “Parliament talk, but they still get 
to vote”. The desire to have a vote did not necessarily indicate a rejection of management per 
se; in fact, by contrast, Partners repeatedly affirmed their belief in the skills and abilities of 
their senior managers: “After all, he’s got the business head”. However this faith in the 
management did not prevent them from wanting to have the safeguard of the vote, even 
though for some this was largely symbolic: 
“We are trying to get more people to believe in the democracy, if we were just having 
discussions, and letting management make all the decisions, that would be worse” (Non-
management Partner, Branch) 
Non-management partners embraced the alternative value system outlined by the founder of 
the JLP. They saw themselves as co-owners of the business and valued the protection 
afforded by the democratic processes even if they did not often feel the need to use them. For 
them democracy was intrinsically valuable. 
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Degenerating Democracy 
It has been noted that the single biggest form of defence against degeneration is to be vigilant 
(Cornforth, 1995). The irony here is that concerns about the democratic structures in the JLP 
led to the democracy project which itself threatened democratic practice. For many managers, 
the main problem with the democratic structures was that they were failing to engage Partners 
in the business: 
“Co-ownership should mean a sense of responsibility; the differentiating characteristic is the 
democracy” (Manager, Head Office) 
‘The responsibilities should accompany the benefits of being a Partner.’ (Senior Manager, 
Branch) 
Several reasons were put forward for this lack of engagement, including disinterest in 
strategic issues, ingratitude, and a failure to grasp the relevance of debates. There was a 
general opinion that the democracy had been allowed to stagnate, and that the business side 
of the Partnership and the democratic structures should have been closely aligned. Some 
managers stated that Partners were disillusioned with the democracy, because they had 
“mistakenly” believed it gave them more power than it actually did. They were at pains to 
point out that the Partnership was co-owned not co-managed. The democracy project and 
specifically the Forums were intended to reinvigorate Branch level democracy, to help 
Partners see the relevance of engaging with the democratic structures, and to develop a more 
“honest” form of democracy. 
Managers were commending a form of Branch level democracy that was concerned with the 
directly experienced elements of the job, that is, with local and operational issues rather than 
central or strategic ones. It was felt that one of the major achievements of the trials was that 
the agenda for meetings was “owned” by the Partners. There were, however, limits to the 
‘directly experienced aspects of the work’ that managers wanted the Forum to focus on. One 
subject that they were keen to see play a much smaller part in democratic debate was trading 
hours. Trading hours were repeatedly identified as the main subject of contention within 
Branches and were the source of long “adversarial” debates at meetings. During the 
democracy trials, Northern Branch was the only one that chose to retain its vote on trading 
hours. This decision clearly sat uncomfortably with management, and although there were 
claims that they were pleased that different models were being trialled, it was apparent from 
interviews, and the presentation of results that this was not the case. Instead, the desire to 
hold on to the vote was seen as a function of its “history” and “traditional attitude”. The two 
stores that embraced the ‘consultation model’ by contrast, were described by managers as 
demonstrating their “faith in management” and using a model that was “more honest and 
responsible”. 
Managers’ constructed a particular reading of the survey findings and presented this as 
incontestable. In addition, the apparent concreteness of the survey data gave their 
interpretation credibility and contributed to the impotence of the Partners and the growing 
dependence on an elite. The effect was that knowledge about what democratic participation 
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might mean was severely constrained. It is argued that what management sought from 
democracy was support for their decisions. The models for the Branch Forum were not 
democratically determined, but rather, were outcomes of a model of employee participation 
that correlated with the management’s desire to minimise the power of dissenting voices and 
maximise a unitarist conception of employee involvement. Participation was not intrinsically 
valuable but was encouraged as long as it addressed subjects that the management felt 
appropriate, discussion of trading hours was not acceptable, whereas performance 
improvements were. In contrast to the “statistical mandate” interpretation of the survey 
results cited by the Registrar, some non-management Partners were aware that the questions 
were designed to shape responses. In 2005, the survey asked Partners to respond to the 
statement “my pay is fair”; by 2006 this had changed to “my pay reflects the market rate and 
my performance”. These changes did not go unnoticed by Partners. The following exchange 
took place in a communication half hour in Northern Branch: 
‘‘Forum Representative: They’ve asked me to get your ideas on how to improve the Partner 
Opinion Survey Results. 
Partner: That’s easy; it’s just a matter of editing the questions until they get the answer that 
suits them 
[Laughter]’’ 
An aspect of the democracy where non-management Partners agreed with managers, was the 
belief that the existing democratic structures were outdated. However, the problem with 
Branch Councils, according to the non-management Partners, was that they were dominated 
by managers and therefore did not represent them. In short, non-management Partners 
recognised that power was becoming concentrated and that the signs of degeneration were 
visible. In order to become a Branch Council representative a Partner had to be nominated by 
a colleague, and only if there was more than one nominee would an election take place. In 
practice this meant a large proportion of Branch Councillors were either Section or 
Departmental managers who would often stand unopposed for many years. Serving on 
Branch Council was a way for managers “to go up the ladder” (Non-management Partner, 
Branch). 
“Imagine that person is quite a big personality in the Branch, it’s quite a big deal even to 
stand against them for election...” (Senior Manager, Head Office) 
Non-management Partners believed that Council has been co-opted by managers, who voted 
as expected in order to demonstrate their allegiance with senior management and progress 
their careers. Whereas the managers had complained that the Branch Councils were too 
adversarial, the non-management Partners were concerned that the Councils were often little 
more than a ‘talking-shop’ (Gazette, 10/12/05). A further source of dissatisfaction was the 
belief that decisions could be overturned if they didn’t coincide with the decisions expected 
by Senior Managers: 
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“We voted on whether to close New Year’s Day, but management told us that we were the 
only one. Management came down really hard; we had to compromise...” (non-management 
Partner, Branch) 
One positive outcome of the democracy project trials was the implementation of a new 
method of appointing representatives to the Branch Forum which replaced the ‘Volunteer’ 
model with a ‘Jury Service’ method. This meant that Partners were given a list of everyone 
that worked in the constituency, and using a secret ballot process indicated who they wanted 
to represent them at the Forum. The forms were collected by the Assistant Branch Registrar 
and the results published in the Chronicle. Of the 70 new Branch Forum Representatives 
elected across the Partnership as part of the democracy project trial, the vast majority were 
non-management Partners, a total reversal of the numbers under the old Branch Council 
model.  
There was a belief that the management were bound by the Constitution and that this placed 
limits on their decision-making power, both in terms of the requirement for Council to ‘sign 
off on decisions’ and the principle that happiness should come before profit: 
“I like to vote, it’s the happiness of the people that work here that counts most, and even 
though times are hard, the Constitution isn’t going anywhere” (non-management Partner, 
Branch) 
This sense of ‘symbolic’ democracy accorded with observations of Branch Council and 
Forum meetings, and the wider democratic bodies like Partnership Council. On several 
occasions, there were full and frank debates, where elected representatives appeared to 
strongly object to some aspect of a proposal. However, despite the rhetoric used in the debate 
itself, when it came to the vote, Partners frequently voted to accept the proposal, in apparent 
contradiction to the words of dissent expressed by them moments before. Observations 
appeared to confirm the finding that employees participate more in discussions about 
operational issues then strategic ones (Ng and Ng, 2009; Ramsay, 1977b; Townsend et al., 
2013a). The limited participation in discussions on items of strategic interest could be due to 
a range of factors, including lack of confidence, understanding, apathy, fear, or the restrictive 
bureaucratic meeting structure. However, here it is suggested that the democratic 
consciousness (Bernstein, 1976: 505) necessary for effective participation played a key role. 
Partners internalised a limited scope for participation which made other possibilities 
unthinkable. Partners at Branch level did not see the purpose of commenting on issues as 
important as pensions because they did not feel that their opinions would influence the 
outcome of debates at Council level. However, whereas Partners saw influencing trading 
hours as their right, other strategic issues which theoretically at least were of equal 
importance to the Partners, were seen as outside of the democratic sphere, a point that was 
constantly reinforced by management communications. Partners were interested in the 
outcome of the discussion, but didn’t feel able to participate in determining that outcome 
themselves. In effect, Partners had internalised a limited scope to their democratic 
consciousness and a combination of “bureaucratic and self-regulation meshed to produce a 
highly-controlled working environment” (McKinlay, 2002: 612). This analysis indicates that 
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Partners had internalised a particular knowledge about democratic participation which 
allowed for dissent but only within strict limits, thus Partners voiced concern, but did not 
often act upon it. 
In summary, the democratic structures in the Partnership were the site of significant 
misunderstanding and power-play. Managers wanted Partners to engage ‘more’ with their 
democratic bodies, but less with contentious subjects; they sought vibrant discussion and 
debate through a model of consultation rather than negotiation, and certainly not voting. In 
short, they wanted to push the democratic structures down the “escalator of participation” 
(Wilkinson et al., 2010: 11) away from any possibility of co-determination and control and 
towards consultation and information. Non-management Partners wanted to engage more 
with their democratic bodies, largely by electing ‘true’ representatives chosen from their own 
ranks. They wanted early consultation on proposals and a clear voice in formulating 
decisions, but they also wanted the vote as both protection from dictatorial managers and as a 
symbol of their rights as co-owners of the business. However, the scope of their democratic 
engagement and the types of decision that they felt able to participate in were limited by 
contested readings about what democratic participation might mean. Partner opinion surveys 
were used to formulate a particular form of democratic experimentation and results were 
interpreted by management as a desire for ‘voice’ but not a desire for ‘democracy’. Opinions 
about the democracy were constructed through informal pressure and partisan readings of 
survey results, in order to constrain the possibilities for democratic engagement across the 
Partnership. 
 
Conclusions 
A key lesson from the analysis of the John Lewis Partnership is that democratic functioning, 
even when protected by a Constitution and legal framework, remains vulnerable to challenges 
from people who seek to constrain and direct it in ways which meet instrumental ends. EIP 
encompasses both formal and informal arrangements which are under continual development 
and renewal (Townsend et al., 2013b). It is clear that organisational democracy is not an end, 
or “amendable to one-shot implementation” (Varman and Chakrabarti, 2004: 204), but rather 
a moving target, subject to constant challenge and reinterpretation which requires vigilance 
and protection. There are signs of degeneration in the JLP ranging from the increases in the 
maximum pay ratio from 1:25 to 1:75, and the growing reliance on non-Partners to deliver 
services such as cleaning (Pooler, 2012), through to the removal of voting rights in the 
majority of Branch Forums. It was noted in the introduction that there was a danger of 
assessing alternative organisations using bureaucratic standards that they do not share 
(Rothschild-Whitt, 1979). Here it argued that one of the reasons for degeneration in the JLP 
is that the value framework is itself subject to contested readings by the management of the 
organisation. 
The article contributes to the literature on participation by challenging the position of the JLP 
as a model of organisational democracy. Reid and Griffith (2006: 7) have claimed that JLP 
are “commendably clear about the limits of their ambitions”, but the evidence here questions 
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that. Despite the claims of democratic practice, this article demonstrates that democracy 
needs to be understood as a contested terrain and that the understanding of democracy 
attributed to the founder is only one of several competing readings in the organisation. 
Furthermore, rather than view the Democracy Project as a desire to reinvigorate and develop 
democratic practices and structures, it is positioned here as a regressive move down the 
escalator of participation. Following Stohl and Cheney (2001) participation is both 
“perceptual and political”, its meaning may be controlled by a dominant group, understood 
differently by different sections of the organisation, and its interpretation can change over 
time. 
Donaghey et al. (2011: 167) note that much of the research on non-union forms of employee 
representation has been characterised by portrayals of “omnipotent management dominating 
an acquiescent workforce”. They conclude that mutual gains are unlikely in an industrial 
relations context of voluntarism and see this as consistent with a unitary framework of human 
resource management. In short, management never intended to share power but simply to 
inform and communicate. Here, it is argued that the unitarist perception of participation as a 
win-win scenario leading to happier, more engaged, productive employees (Cloke and 
Goldsmith, 2002; Mintzberg, 1983) dominated discussions in the JLP. Participation was 
supported by management as a mechanism for facilitating high employee involvement as a 
means of sustained competiveness. Collective rights were always subordinate to the those of 
the business and the language of industrial democracy was co-opted to create cultural control 
(Stewart et al., 2004). However, in this case, the industrial relations context is not one of 
voluntarism, but one where employees are also partners in the business, and have democratic 
rights that are protected by a Constitution. Despite these safeguards, management were able 
to use the democracy project to direct decisions in ways which sought to undermine 
democratic functioning and claw back power from non-management Partners. 
As noted earlier, the degeneration thesis would mean that all forms of co-operativism and 
organisational democracy were destined for failure. Employee-owned companies would 
simply degenerate as the demands for efficiency lead to the dilution and ultimate 
abandonment of principles of solidarity, democracy and equality (Sauser, 2009). There is 
certainly evidence here of a push by management to redefine democracy in ways which 
privilege business interests and managerial prerogative. However, the struggle to direct 
democracy in the JLP is not yet over. In April 2009, the John Lewis Council refused to 
approve a new proposal which would have cemented the practise of ‘consulting with Partners 
in Branches’ rather than allowing Partners to make decisions through democratic structures 
(John Lewis Focus, 03/04/09). The Business Committee had put forward a proposal that 
decisions on trading hours should rest with the head of Branch, after input and influence from 
the Branch Forum. Had this been accepted it would have indicated a clear victory for the 
managerially driven ‘truth’ about the democracy project, namely that Partners did not seek 
democratic participation, but simply required consultation and voice. At the meeting 
Councillors from the eight Branches that had chosen to retain their decision-making power 
during the trial objected to the proposal on the grounds that it meant that the Branch Forum 
would lose the vote. After a long discussion, Councillors voted against the proposal. A 
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successful challenge was made to the “seemingly incontrovertible truth” (Alvesson and 
Willmott, 1992: 435) that Partners did not want democracy. 
Democracy continues to be a contested terrain and the definition and purpose of democratic 
participation is the subject of ongoing debate and conflict. The process of ‘democratic 
renewal’ undertaken by the JLP has redefined participation in a way which undermines 
employee interests and closes down the possibilities for mutual gains. Although this 
definition is not irresistible or final, it does indicate the need for closer scrutiny of the claims 
made about the organisation. 
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Table 1. Results from the Democracy Survey 2005 
 
Question Yes No  
Are you in favour of electing Partners to represent you? 91% 9% 
Would you prefer to have an active, personal role in raising 
questions and deciding on issues yourself? 
30% 70% 
Should we leave the Councils as they are? 42% 58% 
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